a b s t r a c t
Much of our human mental life looks to involve a seamless unfolding of perception, action and experience: a golden braid in which each element twines intimately with the rest. We see the very world we act in and we act in the world we see. But more than this, visual experience presents us with the world in a way apt for the control and fine guidance of action. Or so it seems. Milner and Goodale's [Milner, D., Goodale, M. (1995) . The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Milner, A., Goodale, M. (2006) . Epilogue: Twelve years on. In Milner, A., Goodale, M. (Ed.), The visual brain in action (2nd ed., pp. 207-252). Oxford: Oxford University Press] influential work on the dual visual systems hypothesis casts doubt on certain versions of this intuitive vision. It does so by prising apart the twining strands of conscious visual perception and the fine control of visuomotor action. Such a bold proposal is of major interest both to cognitive science and philosophy. In what follows I first clarify the major claims that the bold proposal involves, then examine three sets of worries and objections. The first set concern some important matters of detail. The second set concern a certain kind of conceptual or philosophical worry to the effect that the perception/action model unfairly equates visual experience itself with what are in fact certain elements within visual experience. The third set concern the very idea of conscious experience as a well-defined conceptual or experimental target. I conclude that the boldest versions of the Dual Visual Systems (2VS) story underestimate the variety and richness of visual experience, but that the general picture of visual uptake as a fragmented, multi-stream, multipurpose adaptation is correct, and still revealing after all these years.
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A bold proposal: vision-for-perception, vision-for-action
Milner and Goodale's bold proposal offers a certain functional gloss on the anatomical complexity of the visual system. This gloss takes as its starting point the existence of two major processing streams (the ventral and the dorsal) projecting from early visual areas to the rest of the human brain. Ungerleider and Mishkin famously depicted these as the 'what' and 'where' streams, each specialized to perceive different aspects of the visual world (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) . On this view, both streams contributed contents (though different ones) to human visual experience. Milner and Goodale later described and defended an alternative functional gloss, according to which one stream supports 'vision-for-action' and the other 'vision-for-perception' (Milner & Goodale, 1995) . Thus the dorsal stream, projecting to the posterior parietal cortex, is said to support the kinds of visuomotor transformation in which visual input leads to fluent actions such as reaching and grasping, while the ventral stream, projecting to the temporal lobe, seems to be especially implicated in the E-mail address: andy.clark@ed.ac.uk. recognition and identification of objects and events. Milner and Goodale further suggest that the dorsal stream computes 'visionfor-action' in a way that is fast, transient, and unconscious, and that the ventral stream computes 'vision-for-perception' in a way that is slower, more enduring, and at least sometimes conscious (Goodale & Milner, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 1995) . The contents of conscious visual experience, for Milner and Goodale, are thus strongly associated with the coding and processing operations carried out by the ventral stream.
To illustrate the way these two streams are then meant to interact, Goodale and Milner develop an analogy with tele-assistance approaches to the remote control of robots in distant or hostile environments (Goodale & Milner, 2004) . Here, a conscious human operator and a non-conscious semi-intelligent distal robot combine forces so as to perform actions in some environment (for example, in the control of a Mars rover, where the human operator reviews images on a screen in Texas, flagging items of interest that the robot can locate and retrieve using its own on-board sensory systems and sensorimotor routines). Such approaches are contrasted with tele-operation solutions, in which the conscious human operator controls all the spatial and temporal aspects of the robots movements (perhaps via a joystick or a set of sensors that allow the operators own arm and hand movements to be relayed to the robot).
